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ABSTRACT
While widely adopted in practical applications, face recognition has
been critically discussed regarding the malicious use of face images
and the potential privacy problems, e.g., deceiving payment sys-
tem and causing personal sabotage. Online photo sharing services
unintentionally act as the main repository for malicious crawler
and face recognition applications. This work aims to develop a
privacy-preserving solution, called Adversarial Privacy-preserving
Filter (APF), to protect the online shared face images from being
maliciously used. We propose an end-cloud collaborated adversarial
attack solution to satisfy requirements of privacy, utility and non-
accessibility. Specifically, the solutions consist of three modules: (1)
image-specific gradient generation, to extract image-specific gradi-
ent in the user end with a compressed probe model; (2) adversarial
gradient transfer, to fine-tune the image-specific gradient in the
server cloud; and (3) universal adversarial perturbation enhance-
ment, to append image-independent perturbation to derive the final
adversarial noise. Extensive experiments on three datasets validate
the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed solution. A proto-
type application is also released for further evaluation. We hope the
end-cloud collaborated attack framework could shed light on ad-
dressing the issue of online multimedia sharing privacy-preserving
issues from user side.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Privacy protections; Usability in se-
curity and privacy.
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Figure 1: Schematic illustration of the proposed adversar-
ial privacy-preserving filter. Given a face image, the syn-
thetic adversarial image is expected to fool the malicious
face recognition algorithm.
1 INTRODUCTION
Benefited from both algorithmic development and the adequate
face image data, face recognition has been widely adopted in ap-
plications like criminal monitoring, security unlock, digital ticket
and even face payment. However, the discussion of privacy prob-
lems caused by the unreasonable use of face images has never been
stopped. Kneron tested that widely used face payment systems
like AliPay and WeChat can be fooled by masks and face images,
and Deepfake creating imitated videos causes severe personal sabo-
tage [2]. Among the sources of personal face images, online photo
sharing services unintentionally act as the main repository for
malicious crawler and face recognition applications. Recently, a
company called Clearview AI was disclosed to crawl face images
from Facebook, YouTube, Venmo and other websites, and construct
a database containing more than three billion images âĂŤ goes far
beyond anything ever constructed by the United States government.
Therefore, it is critical to design privacy-preserving solutions for
photo sharing services to protect the uploaded face images from
being maliciously used.
This paper aims to preserve users’ portrait privacy without af-
fecting their photo sharing experience. Two requirements need to
be first satisfied: (1) privacy, that user’s identification information is
unrecognizable from the shared face images; (2) utility, that the face
image quality should not be undermined. It is interesting to note
that adversarial attack [31] exactly meets the above requirements:
(1) the direct consequence of adversarial attack is to mislead model
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predictions which is consistent to fool the malicious face recogni-
tion algorithms; and (2) the introduced adversarial perturbation
is trivial and imperceptible to human, thus retaining the image
perception and utility for photo sharing. Therefore, we exploit ad-
versarial attack to design the privacy-preserving filter, which adds
adversarial perturbation to the original image before uploading to
photo sharing services and expects to mislead the malicious face
recognition algorithms (illustrated in Fig. 1).
While sharing the adversarial face image guarantees privacy-
preserving on photo sharing services, there still remains risk of
privacy leakage when generating the adversarial images. Since
most adversarial attack solutions involve with complex models
and massive computation operations, it is typical to upload the
original face images to the privacy-preserving filter server for pro-
cessing. This inevitably exposes the original face image to the third-
party application and makes them vulnerable both during trans-
mission and in the cloud. Therefore, a third requirement is needed
for privacy-preserving filter: non-accessibility, that the original face
image should only be accessible in the user end. To address this,
we propose an end-cloud collaborated adversarial attack solution,
where the original face image is only used to extract image-specific
gradient in the user end with a compressed probe model, and the
image-specific gradient is then fine-tuned in the server cloud with
state-of-the-art model to generate the final adversarial noise. The
end-cloud collaborated solution succeeds to resolve the paradox
between the computation shortage in the end and the privacy leak-
age risk in the cloud. Moreover, to improve the attack performance
of the generated adversarial perturbation in the cloud, we further
introduce the image-independent universal adversarial perturba-
tion for enhancement, which demonstrates effectiveness in both
accelerated training convergence and stronger attacking capability.
The contributions of the paper can be summarized as follows:
• We designed an adversarial privacy-preserving filter to pre-
serve users’ portrait privacy from malicious face recognition
crackers without affecting their photo sharing experience.
Adversarial attack naturally meets the two basic require-
ments of privacy and utility.
• We proposed an end-cloud collaborated adversarial attack
framework, which addresses the additional non-accessibility
requirement to guarantee the original image only accessible
to users’ own device end. The compatible performance of
this two-stage attack with the traditional one-stage attack (in
Section 4.2.3) also provides a novel perspective to understand
the adversarial attack problem.
• We integrated the universal adversarial perturbation with
image-dependent perturbation to obtain improved privacy-
preserving capability. This sheds light on alternative way to
exploit adversarial examples.
• We conducted extensive experiments to validate the effec-
tiveness and efficiency of the proposed solution framework.
A prototype of adversarial privacy-preserving filter is further
carried out and released for evaluation.
2 RELATEDWORK
2.1 Privacy-preserving Photo Sharing
With the increasing popularity of Online Social Networks(OSNs),
privacy-preserving photo sharing has received considerable at-
tention [15, 28, 35]. Existing attempts can be roughly categorized
into preserving image metadata [37], setting access control proto-
cols [12] or sharing privacy policies [28, 29], and explicitly encrypt-
ing ROI region before uploading but decrypting after download-
ing [29, 35]. Different from these studies, the goal of this work is to
hide the face identification information when sharing to OSN so
that the potential image crawler and face cracker cannot use it for
malicious usage.
2.2 Adversarial Attack
In the last few years, it has been witnessed that the existing machine
learning models, not just deep neural networks, are vulnerable to
adversarial attack [31]. Szegedy et al. [31] first introduced the prob-
lem of adversarial attack, and proposed a box-constrained L-BFGS
method to find adversarial examples. To address the expensive com-
putation, Goodfellow et al. [8] proposed Fast Gradient Sign Method
(FGSM) to generate adversarial examples by performing a single
gradient step, which later becomes a widely-used baseline attack
method on image classification. Kurakin et al. [14] extended this
method to an iterative version (I-FGSM). Dong et al. [5] further
improved adversarial examples by adopting momentum term (MI-
FGSM). Another line of works generated adversarial examples by
solving an optimization problem. Xie et al. [34] proposed DI2-FGSM
and M-DI2-FGSM by adopting input diversity strategy, which fo-
cused on improving the transferability and achieved state-of-the-art
performance in black-box setting.
There exist many recent attempts to explore the adversarial
attack problem in face recognition applications. Sharif et al. [27]
and Komkov et al. [13] proposed face recognition attack solutions by
modifying facial attributes like adding virtual eyeglasses to imper-
sonate other subjects or prevent them from being recognized. Dong
et al. [6] proposed a query-based method for generating adversarial
faces in black-box setting, which requires at least 1, 000 queries to
the face recognition system. Some other works, e.g., AdvFaces [3]
focused on employing Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) [7]
to craft new adversarial images from original face images. How-
ever, although the above face recognition attack solutions easily
satisfy the privacy requirement mentioned in Section 1, they may
violate either the utility or non-accessibility requirement: (1) Attack
solutions like modifying facial attributes and employing GAN tend
to introduce non-trivial perturbation and make the perturbed face
images unsuitable for sharing. (2) The above solutions all request
to access the original face images, which leaves privacy-leakage
risk in the cloud. Different from the existing face recognition attack
solutions, in this work, we propose an end-cloud collaborated adver-
sarial attack solution to simultaneously satisfy the privacy, utility
and non-accessibility requirements. Moreover, the solution is com-
patible to allow instantiation with most of the existing adversarial
attack algorithms.
In addition to the above image-dependent adversarial attacks,
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [20] found a type of image-independent
noise called universal adversarial perturbation (UAP), which can
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Table 1: Notation and explanations.
Symbol Notation
x original image
xe enrolled image
fθ face recognition model with parameter θ
д naive gradient generated on probe model
д˜ gradient generated on server model
дˆ transferred gradient
u universal perturbation
uˆ enhanced universal perturbation
s enhanced adversarial noise
ϵ maximum change restriction of each pixel
d distance function
L loss function
T gradient transfer module
E enhancement module
APF_д adversarial image based on naive gradient
APF_дˆ adversarial image based on transferred gradient
APF_s adversarial image based on enhanced adversarial noise
Imaдes_u adversarial image based on universal perturbation
mislead the pre-trainedmodel for different images. Following this, Pour-
saeed et al. [22] trained a generative network for generating uni-
versal adversarial perturbations (GAP), and Li et al. [16] observed
the property of regional homogeneity and generated regionally
homogeneous perturbations (RHP). These studies demonstrate the
possibility of attacking the classification of specific images with uni-
versal perturbation. Inspired by this, on the basis of image-specific
perturbations, we further enhance the adversarial examples with
universal adversarial perturbations in the cloud, with improved
training convergence as well as attack performance verified in the
later experiments.
3 METHODOLOGY
3.1 Problem Definition and Notations
Definition 1 (Adversarial Privacy-preserving Filter).
Given an original image x, we assume that a face recognition
model fθ outputs an l-dimension vector as embedding feature
fθ (x). xe represents the corresponding enrolled image, when the
distance d(fθ (x), fθ (xe )) between the two images is less than a
certain threshold, they are judged to be the same subject, otherwise
they are different subjects.
The main focus of this paper is to design the adversarial privacy-
preserving filter (APF) that is an adversarial invisible noise s , making
the adversarial example x+s look the same with x from the perspec-
tive of human observation but does not belong to the same subject
from the perspective of face recognition model fθ . Under the con-
dition of ensuring image quality, it preserves usersâĂŹ portrait
privacy without affecting their photo sharing experience.
The main notations of this work are summarized in Table 1.
3.2 Overall Framework
The working flow of privacy-preserving filter is illustrated in Fig. 2,
where three parts are involved as user end, privacy-preserving
server cloud and photo sharing service. Given a portrait image, its
image-specific gradient is first extracted in the user end, and then
issued to the privacy-preserving server cloud for enhancement to
derive adversarial noise. After perturbed by the enhanced adver-
sarial noise, the resultant adversarial portrait image is expected
to fool the potential face cracker on photo sharing service. It is
noted that the original image is accessible only to user end during
the whole process, preventing information leakage even on the
privacy-preserving server.
The core solution is an end-cloud collaborated adversarial attack
framework, consisting of three algorithm modules deployed respec-
tively in the user end and server cloud: (1) Image-specific gradient
generation is to obtain the image-specific gradient by employing
a compressed probe model runnable in the end. (2) Adversarial
gradient transfer module is to align the image gradient from probe
model and the server model in the cloud, with the goal to recover
the adversarial information fooling practical crackers. (3) Universal
adversarial perturbation enhancement module is to append image-
independent universal perturbation to further enhance the derived
adversarial noise. The following will elaborate each module.
3.3 Image-specific Gradient Generation
Following the non-accessibility requirement, users’ original face
images should not be uploaded to the cloud server to avoid leakage.
However, most of the existing adversarial attack algorithms are too
complicated to be deployed in the end due to their high demands
on computing resources. Therefore, our solution is to employ a
compressed model in the user end to extract preliminary informa-
tion from original image to mismatch the enrolled image, and then
enhance the information in the cloud.
Specifically, we use the compressed model as probe model in
the user end to extract image-specific adversarial gradient д. Noted
that different adversarial attack algorithms are allowed, which lead
to д with different levels of intensity under the same maximum per-
turbation. In experiments we will discuss the influence of different
adversarial gradient extraction algorithms. In this subsection, we
employ FGSM as the example algorithm to introduce this process.
Following standard adversarial attack operation, image-specific
gradient д for original image x is extracted by:
д = ϵ · siдn(∇xL(x, xe;θ )) (1)
where xe is the corresponding enrolled image, θ denotes the net-
work parameters, ϵ ensures that the generated gradient is within
the ϵ-ball in the L∞ space, and sign(·) denotes the sign function.
L(·) is the loss function that measures the distance between the
original face image and the enrolled image:
L(x, xe;θ ) = −d(fθ (x), fθ (xe)) (2)
where fθ (·) represents the embedding feature, d(·, ·) is distance
function. We use Euclidian distance in our work.
3.4 Adversarial Gradient Transfer
The small-scale probe model extracts the image gradient in the
user end for generating adversarial samples. However, since the
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Figure 2: The proposed adversarial privacy-preserving filter framework.
structure and parameters of probe model in the end and server
model in the cloud are different, the gradient cannot be used directly.
To align the image gradient between probe model and server model,
we propose the gradient transfer module T , which is defined as:
дˆ = T (д) (3)
We consider the gradient transfer module as an image-to-image
translation network. The U-Net architecture is widely used in image-
to-image translation problem, which is an encoder-decoder network
with skip connections between the encoder and the decoder [23].
We employ this architecture for transferring gradients from probe
model to server model. Specifically, we train the gradient transfer
module as the following optimization problem:
min
θT
∥дˆ − д˜∥2 (4)
where д˜ is the gradient generated on server model following Eqn. (1)
and θT represents the parameters of network T . This objective
function enforces the network T to learn the correlation between
the probe model and server model.
Potential crackers may use multiple face recognition models,
which is essentially a black-box adversarial attack problem. It is
recognized that adversarial perturbation is transferable between
models: if an adversarial image remains effective for multiple mod-
els, it is more likely to transfer to other models as well [18]. Inspired
by this, to improve the attack performance to unknown cracking
models, we implement the gradient transfer module not only for
one-to-one domain transfer but also for one-to-many.
Specifically, given K white-box face recognition models with
their corresponding gradient д˜1, ..., д˜k , we re-formulate the loss
function in Eqn. (4) by replacing д˜ with д˜ensemble :
д˜ensemble =
K∑
k=1
αk д˜k (5)
where αk is the ensemble weight with
∑K
k=1 αk = 1. For many face
recognition models, the larger the value of K , the stronger the gen-
eralization capability of the derived adversarial images. However,
an excessive K value will lead to high computational complexity
and trivial weight αk to underemphasize single model. We select
K = 2 and evenly set αk = 1/2 1. In this study, we respectively
select two of three state-of-the-art face recognition models as en-
semble models for training and the remaining one as black-box
model for testing. The performance of employing ensemble adver-
sarial training to resist different face recognition models is reported
in Section 4.3.1.
3.5 Universal Adversarial Perturbation
Enhancement
As claimed in previous studies [16, 20, 22], universal adversarial
perturbation contains image-independent information to mislead
the classification of multiple images. This inspires us to integrate
the image-specific information and image-independent information
to enhance the performance of adversarial perturbation. Referring
to the previous study [20], universal adversarial perturbation is a
vector u that causes label change for most images sampled from
the data distribution η:
Cˆ(x + u) , Cˆ(x) for most x ∼ η (6)
1 Usually αk = 1/K except when prior is available to emphasize on some
of the models.
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where Cˆ is a classification function that outputs for each image x
an estimated label Cˆ(x). The previous universal adversarial pertur-
bation studies produce a universal perturbation with the goal to
cause image misclassification for the non-target attack [16, 20, 22].
Instead of directly misleading image classification, we expect such
a universal adversarial perturbation u, that provides a fixed image-
independent perturbation deviating the examined face image far
away from other face images. Therefore, we derive the naive uni-
versal perturbation as follow:
u = max
u
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
d(fθ (xi + u), fθ (xj )) (7)
where n represents the number of all images contained in the
dataset.
To integrate the image-specific perturbation and image-independent
perturbation, we further design an enhancement module to adapt
the domain of the universal perturbation u with the domain of дˆ.
The enhancement module E consists of a scale transformation layer
and a 1 × 1 convolution layer, which is defined as follows:
uˆ = E(u) = conv(β · u + γ ) (8)
where β and γ are trainable parameters and conv(·) is the 1 × 1
convolution layer. The overall optimization problem incorporating
the two proposed modules is as follows:
max
θT ,θE
d(fθ (x + clipϵ (дˆ + uˆ)), fθ (xe )) (9)
where clipϵ (·) indicates clipping the input within the ϵ-ball, θT de-
notes the parameters of network T , and θE denotes the parameters
of network E.
Specifically, to employ ensemble adversarial attack, similar to
Eqn. (5), given K face recognition models with their correspond-
ing embedding feature f1, ..., fk , we reformulate Eqn. (9) to derive
the final objective function by replacing fθ (·) with f˜ (·) defined as
follows:
f˜ (·) =
K∑
k=1
αk fk (·) (10)
Network E and T are then trained by solving the above final objec-
tive function. The output uˆ and дˆ of E and T are added to derive s .
The cloud will output s , and then returned to user end to add it to
the original image to derive the privacy preserved image, which
can be safely shared to OSNs.
4 EXPERIMENTS
4.1 Experimental Settings
Datasets. We train the gradient transfer module T and the en-
hancement module E on the subset of MS-Celeb-1M dataset [9].
LFW dataset [11], AgeDB-30 dataset [21] and CFP-FP dataset [26]
are used as test datasets to verify the effectiveness of the proposed
privacy-preserving filter. In the experiment, we select subjects with
at least two face images, where one is used as the enrolled image,
and the other is for synthesizing the adversarial image.
• MS-Celeb-1M contains 10 million images. We randomly se-
lect 50, 000 face images of 1, 000 subjects for training, where
each subject contains 50 face images.
• LFW contains 13, 233 images of 5, 749 different subjects.
According to the refined version of Deng et al. [4], we use
12, 000 images to construct 6, 000 pairs of images, of which
3, 000 pairs are positive pairs (belong to the same person)
and 3, 000 pairs are negative pairs (belong to the different
persons).
• AgeDB-30 contains 16, 488 images of 568 different subjects.
According to the refined version of Deng et al. [4], we use
14, 000 images to construct 7, 000 pairs of images, of which
3, 500 pairs are positive and 3, 500 pairs are negative.
• CFP-FP contains 7, 000 images of 500 different subjects. We
use all images to construct 3, 500 positive pairs.
Face Recognition Models. In this study, we employ 4 state-of-
the-art face recognition models to verify the effectiveness of the
adversarial examples generated by our privacy-preserving models.
MobileFaceNet [1] is served as probe model, and ArcFace [4] is
used as default server model. To demonstrate the resistance to
unknown cracking models, we introduce ArcFace, FaceNet [25] and
SphereFace [17] as server models in Section 4.3.1.
• MobileFaceNet is specifically tailored for high-accuracy
real-time face verification on mobile devices with 5.20MB
model size, whose backbone network is MobileNet-V2 [24].
It was trained on MS-Celeb-1M dataset.
• ArcFace is the best public Face ID system, whose backbone
network is Resnet-v2-152 [10]. It was trained on MS-Celeb-
1M dataset.
• FaceNet and SphereFace were trained on CASIA-WebFace
dataset [36]. The backbone networks of FaceNet and SphereFace
are Inception-Resnet-v1 [30] and Sphere20 [17], respectively.
EvaluationMetrics. Recalling that the positioned privacy-preser-
ving filtering problem is to both invalid the potential face recog-
nition cracker and retain the original image quality, we introduce
evaluation metrics regarding these two goals respectively.
For invaliding crackers, we use the standard attack success rate
(ASR) [34] as the evaluation metric.
• ASR measures the effectiveness of our adversarial perturba-
tion:
ASR =
Nw/ − Nw/o
Ntotal
(11)
where Nw/ and Nw/o denote the number of correctly recog-
nized face images with and without perturbation2, respec-
tively. Ntotal denotes the total number of face images. The
higher the ASR value, the better the adversarial perturbation
effect, and the more satisfied the privacy requirement.
For retaining the original image quality, we quantify the simi-
larity between the perturbed images and the original images via
structural similarity (SSIM) [32].
• SSIM is a normalized metric whose values range from −1
to 1, which means the similarity from completely different
image pairs to identical image pairs:
2 In this study, we use L∞ distance to restrict each pixel’s change within a
maximum scale, but with no limit on the number of pixels that are modified.
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Figure 3: The example adversarial images perturbed by s.
Three rows correspond to three different datasets, and each
column corresponds to a different gradient extraction algo-
rithm in Table 2.
SSIM(x ,y) = (2µx µy + c1)(2σxy + c2)(µ2x + µ2y + c1)(σ 2x + σ 2y + c2)
(12)
Here, x and y are the two images to be compared, µx , µy ,
σx ,σy , σxy are the means and variances of x and y, the
covariance of x and y, respectively. ci = (di J )2, where J =
(2(♯ of bits per pixel) − 1), d1 = 0.01, d2 = 0.03 by default [33].
The higher the SSIM value, the more similar to the original
image, and the more satisfied the utility requirement.
Implementation Details. We adopt ADAM optimizer with a
fixed learning rate of 0.0001 for the entire network. Each mini-batch
consists of 100 face images. The maximum perturbation ϵ of each
pixel is set to be 8, which is more imperceptible for human observers
than general adversarial perturbation [19]. The embedding feature
dimension l of MobileFaceNet, ArcFace, FaceNet and SphereFace is
set to 192, 512, 128 and 512, respectively. Different face recognition
models have different input sizes. We resize the input images to
112 × 112 × 3 for ArcFace and MobileFaceNet, 160 × 160 × 3 for
FaceNet and 96 × 96 × 3 for SphereFace. For adversarial gradient
extraction algorithms (I-FGSM, MI-FGSM, DI2-FGSM and M-DI2-
FGSM) are as follows: (1) For stochastic image transformations, we
consider 3 transformations: rescaling, rotation and color conversion.
(2) The probability of transformations is set to be 0.5. (3) The step
size is set to be 2. (4) The total iteration number is set to be 30. (5)
The decay factor of momentum term is set to be 1.
4.2 Performance Evaluation
4.2.1 OnPrivacy and Utility. Traditional adversarial attackmeth-
ods are usually under the assumption of being accessible to original
images. In this subsection, on the premise of satisfying the non-
accessibility requirement, we discuss the experimental results of our
end-cloud collaborated solution on different adversarial gradient
extraction algorithms and datasets.
To demonstrate how our method meets the privacy requirement,
the ASRs of all the compared methods based on 5 adversarial gra-
dient extraction algorithms (FGSM, I-FGSM, MI-FGSM, DI2-FGSM
and M-DI2-FGSM) are examined and shown in Table 2. APF_д,
0.6
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Figure 4: The SSIMs between the generated adversarial im-
ages and original images. The reference line 0.8 indicates the
high quality of the adversarial images.
APF_дˆ and APF_s indicate the output adversarial images at three
processing stages: generating images only based on the naive ad-
versarial gradient д extracted by probe model in the user end, gen-
erating images based on the transferred gradient дˆ in the cloud, and
generating images based on the enhanced adversarial noise s which
contains image-specific noise and image-independent universal
perturbation. We have the following main findings: (1) In the case
of meeting non-accessibility requirement, the ASRs of our proposed
method on the three datasets reach 98.8%, 95.5% and 88.3%, respec-
tively. The good attack performance proves that the proposed filter
can preserve user’s privacy by fooling face recognition models. (2)
Our privacy-preserving filter is compatible with various gradient
extraction algorithms. The stronger the gradient extraction algo-
rithms (viewing the results of the five algorithms shown in Table 2
from left to right), the better performance the filter achieves. This
suggests us to use more effective adversarial gradient extraction
algorithm when deploying the proposed framework in practical
applications. (3) For each gradient extraction algorithm,APF_дˆ per-
forms better thanAPF_д andAPF_s achieves the best performance,
which verify the effectiveness of the gradient transfer module and
universal adversarial perturbation module.
To demonstrate how our method meets the utility requirement,
some example images corresponding toAPF_s mentioned in Table 2
are shown in Fig. 3. We can see that it is hard to tell the difference
between original images and synthesized adversarial images from
the perspective of human observation. We further use the quantita-
tive metrics to measure image quality. SSIMs between the processed
images and the original images on LFW dataset are illustrated in
Fig. 4. We can observe that, when SSIM value of an image is greater
than 0.6, the human eye can hardly tell the difference. The SSIMs
of our processed images are all greater than 0.8, which indicates
that the adversarial examples generated by our method can not
only effectively interfere with the crack of face recognition, but
also provide users with high-quality images to upload to the OSNs
for use.
4.2.2 The Influence of Universal Adversarial Perturbation Enhance-
ment. As mentioned in Section 4.2.1, universal perturbation can
enhance the performance of adversarial images. In this subsection,
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Table 2: The ASRs on LFW, AgeDB-30 and CFP-FP datasets.
Datasets Adversarial Images FGSM I-FGSM MI-FGSM DI2-FGSM M-DI2-FGSM UAP GAP RHP
LFW
APF_д 74.5% 86.8% 88.2% 92.4% 89.1% - - -
APF_дˆ 91.9% 95.4% 89.8% 96.9% 96.5% - -
APF_s 94.8% 97.4% 95.7% 98.8% 98.8% - -
Imaдes_u - - - - - 27.9% 11.3 4.3%
original image accessible 98.5% 99.4% 99.4% 99.4% 99.27% - - -
AgeDB-30
APF_д 81.7% 86.3% 88.1% 90.5% 88.6% - - -
APF_дˆ 82.3% 90.8% 90.8% 94.9% 92.8% - - -
APF_s 88.3% 93.4% 93.8% 95.5% 94.7% - - -
Imaдes_u - - - - - 22.0% 23.7 13.1%
original image accessible 95.8% 96.0% 96.0% 96.0% 96.0% - - -
CFP-FP
APF_д 48.6% 57.2% 63.8% 68.3% 65.0% - - -
APF_дˆ 51.8% 72.8% 74.9% 84.7% 78.1% - - -
APF_s 67.4% 79.6% 82.8% 88.3% 85.3% - - -
Imaдes_u - - - - - 8.0% 6.1% 3.1%
original image accessible 92.5% 93.7% 90.8% 93.2% 93.4% - - -
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Figure 5: Convergence curve w/ and w/o universal perturba-
tion enhancement.
we report further experimental results to examine the influence of
universal perturbation enhancement. Testing ASRs of APF_дˆ and
APF_s based on DI2-FGSM of LFW dataset are shown in Fig. 5 with
respect to the training epochs. We can observe that: (1) The ASR
curve of APF_s is almost always above APF_дˆ, which is consistent
with the observation from Table 2 that APF_s outperforms APF_дˆ.
(2) APF_s converges nearly within an epoch, which is much faster
than APF_дˆ. To understand the mechanism behind, we analyze
the training process of the network. For ease of description, the
loss functions in Eqn. (9) are defined as Ls . Universal adversarial
perturbation u will be transmitted to Ls by forward propagation,
then ∇θT Ls will affect the training of gradient transfer module by
backward propagation. The enhancement module itself is easy to
train due to very few parameters it has. So the convergence speed
is accelerated.
Moreover, three kinds of adversarial images Images_u perturbed
by only the universal adversarial attack methods (UAP, GAP, RHP)
are also implemented for comparison. As shown in Table 2, we
can observe that these universal adversarial attack methods fail
to achieve a reasonable ASR. This demonstrates that, while uni-
versal adversarial perturbation has potential to simultaneously at-
tack multiple images, it singly cannot guarantee a promised attack
performance compared with traditional attack methods utilizing
image-specific information.
We propose a strategy that combining universal adversarial per-
turbation with image-dependent adversarial gradient, and achieve
a productive performance. We hope this study could draw atten-
tion to this combination on the other adversarial attack tasks, e.g.,
classification, object detection, semantic segmentation.
4.2.3 On Non-accessibility. To examine the potential of the pro-
posed two-stage attack solution to approximate the traditionally
generated adversarial perturbation, we further compare APF with
the adversarial attack setting violating the non-accessibility require-
ment, noted as original image accessible in Table 2. For this setting,
the original images are assumed to be exposed to the server, where
adversarial images are generated by 5 adversarial gradient extrac-
tion server models. As shown in Table 2, the proposed end-cloud
collaborated privacy-preserving solution (APF_s) obtains compa-
rable performance with the setting accessible to original images.
This demonstrates that, even without directly accessing the origi-
nal images, it is possible to achieve remarkable attack performance
by conducting auxiliary operations such as gradient transfer and
universal perturbation enhancement introduced in this study. This
result on one hand opens up possibility for alternative way of im-
plementing adversarial attack, but on the other hand imposes the
new challenge to adversarial defense in the future when original
samples are not available.
4.3 Real-world Implementation Discussion
4.3.1 Transferability and Black-box Attack. Since what face recog-
nition models the cracker use is unknown and typical crackers
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Table 3: Black-box ASRs on different training-testing pairs.
Training Models Testing ModelsFaceNet SphereFace ArcFace Average
raw 83.0% 50.2% 92.5% 75.1%
FaceNet 95.2% 75.6% 98.3% 89.6%
SphereFace 91.5% 85.6% 96.7% 91.1%
ArcFace 93.8% 73.3% 98.8% 88.5%
Ensemble(F+S) 95.1% 81.8% 98.6% 91.7%
may use multiple face recognition models, in practice the privacy-
preserving effectiveness essentially depends on the solutionâĂŹs
generalization and transferability under black-box attack settings.
To address this, we implemented 3 servermodels of ArcFace, FaceNet
and SphereFace, and evaluated the attack performance on the gen-
erated adversarial images from APF_s. The adversarial gradient
extraction algorithm is fixed as DI2-FGSM, and the ASRs are calcu-
lated based on the LFW dataset. To construct the black-box attack
setting, among the 3 server models, FaceNet and SphereFace are
selected as white-box models, and ArcFace is selected as the black-
box model due to its wide utilization in public Face ID system3
In addition, we also examined the performance of the ensemble
adversarial attack combining FaceNet (F) and SphereFace (S).
Table 3 shows the black-box ASR under different training-testing
pairs. For example, the value of 98.6% represents the ASR trained
with ensembled white-box models and tested on ArcFace. Higher
ASR value means superior resistance performance to malicious face
recognition model and better transferability of the method. There
are several observations: (1) The adversarial images (the last four
lines) generated by any model outperform than these adversarial
images (first row) generated by naive adversarial gradient extrac-
tion algorithms. This demonstrates our proposed framework can
improve the transferability of adversarial images, without limita-
tion with specific models. (2) The adversarial images generated
with a special model perform well when they are tested by the
corresponding model, but slightly worse on the other models. It
is expected that the white-box attack has better performance than
black-box attack does. (3) When the adversarial images are gen-
erated by ensemble models and are attacked by ArcFace model
(as the black-box), the ASR (98.6%) is higher than the other two
black-box methods (95.1%, 81.8%), even almost catches up with
the white-box ASR (98.8%). It verifies the transferability of our
proposed method in employing ensemble training towards black-
box attacking. (4) The average ASRs of ensemble training model
is the highest among all training models. It is expected with more
models implemented in ensemble training, the ASR performance
towards arbitrary black-box attacking methods will be guaranteed.
Referring to previous the study [18], it is reasonable to choose the
model with the large structure differences to employ ensemble ad-
versarial training. In practical applications, we can carefully select
3 The black-box model is to simulate the possible cracking face recognition
choices in real-world applications. Therefore, a widely employed model can
better evaluate the privacy-preserving performance in practice.
Table 4: ASRs for adversarial-original and adversarial-
adversarial matching.
Adversarial-original Adversarial-adversarial
DI2 w/o δ 90.2% 40.6%w/ δ 86.7% 96.4%
M-DI2 w/o δ 98.3% 27.2%w/ δ 98.4% 94.7%
widely-used white-box models with typically different structures to
improve the generalization and transferability to specific models.
4.3.2 Adversarial-adversarial Image Matching. The above experi-
ments all assume that the enrolled image is original image without
adversarial perturbation. However, in practice, there is a chance
when the enrolled image collected by face crackers is already ad-
versarially filtered, i.e., the problem turns to match between the
adversarial images from unique user. To examine the performance
of the proposed solution under this situation, we randomly selected
5, 000 testing images from 100 subjects in the MS-Celeb-1M dataset.
Among the 50 images for each subject, we set one image as the
enrolled image and the remaining 49 to generate the adversarial
images.
Following Eqn. (1) and (2) to generate adversarial images, we
evaluate the following two settings for each subject: (1) adversarial-
original, matching between the 49 adversarial images and the orig-
inal enrolled image; (2) adversarial-adversarial, matching among
the 49 adversarial images. The resultant average ASR is reported
in Table 4 using adversarial attack methods of DI2-FGSM and M-
DI2-FGSM (first row for each method). The results show that it is
easy to match between two adversarial images for the same subject
(with ASR of 40.6% and 27.2%) and the proposed solution fails to
attack the face cracker under this situation.
We owe this result to that with the fixed feature of enrolled
image fθ (xe) in Eqn. (2), the generated adversarial images from the
49 original images tend to be similar and are easy to be grouped into
one subject. Therefore, we introduce a random noise δ to modify
Eqn. (2) as follows:
L(x, xe;θ ) = −d(fθ (x), fθ (xe) + δ ) (13)
where δ is a random vector with 10% elements following a uniform
distribution U (−0.07, 0.07) and the remaining 90% setting as 0. δ
acts as a random rotation deviation from the feature of the enrolled
image, so to prevent the generated adversarial images overfitting
along unique gradient direction. The results of generating adver-
sarial examples via Eqn. (13) are shown in the second row for each
attackmethod in Table 4. It is observed that the introduction of δ sig-
nificantly improves ASR for adversarial-adversarial while basically
maintains the high ASR for adversarial-original. This modification
guarantees the privacy-preserving effectiveness of our proposed
solution under adversarial-adversarial matching situation.
5 CONCLUSION
In this study, we introduce a portrait photo privacy-preserving
solution when sharing to OSNs to resist malicious crawler and face
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recognition usage. The proposed end-cloud collaborated adversarial
attack solution is validated to well satisfy all three requirements
of privacy, utility and non-accessibility. A prototype is also car-
ried out which is available at: https://github.com/ACM-MM-2020-
Submission/Submission123. The demo video illustrates the pro-
posed APF solution and this prototype is attached in supplementary
materials.
In the future, in addition to testing the solutionâĂŹs effective-
ness in practical trials, we are also interested to work towards the
following two directions: (1) the combination of traditional image-
specific gradient and image-independent universal perturbation
in more attack scenarios, and (2) the attack and defense attempts
under situations the original sample is not accessible.
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